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Abs t ract
Rogoff ,  1985,  suggest ed that  centr al bank i ndependence w oul d l ead to l ow er
i nfl ati on but  greater out put  vari abil i t y.  Al esina and G at t i ,  1995,  dem onst r ated
Rogoff ’ s w ork w as part i al by onl y consi deri ng econom i c sources of out put
vari abil i t y.  By i ncl udi ng pol i t i cal factors, cir cum stances could be i dent i f i ed w hen
ma k i ng a centr al bank i ndependent  coul d reduce bot h i nfl ati on and out put
vari abil i t y.  In EM U ,  how ever,  there is no choi ce about  centr al bank i ndependence.
St art i ng w i t h a review  of the analysi s presented by A l esina and G at t i ,  thi s paper
suggest s nat i onal   f i scal  pol i cies coul d also be a source of  pol i t i call y-i nduced out put
vari abil i t y.  I t  r eint erprets the analysi s of Al esina and G at t i  and i dent i f i es
cir cum stances w hen the St abil i t y and G row t h Pact coul d hel p t o reduce out put
vari abil i t y  i n  EM U.
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i n Econom i cs,  bot h at  t he Ce nt r e f or  Eur opean Econom i c St udi es,  De p a r t me n t   of  Econom i cs,  Un i versit y of
Lei cester,   Un i versit y  Roa d,   Lei cester,   LE1  7RH ,   UK.2
Introduct i on
On e  o f  t he concerns w i t h havi ng m onet ary pol i cy imp l em ented by an
i ndependent   centr al  bank  i s t he  possibl e i m pact  such pol i cy del egati on  coul d  have  on
t he real econom y i n general and out put  vari abil i t y i n part i cular.  Rogoff  (1985)
show ed  how   t he  del egati on  of  m onet ary  pol i cy t o  an i ndependent   centr al  bank  w oul d
r esult  in hi gher out put  vari abil i t y despi t e an unchanged average level of out put .
Al esina and Ga t t i   ( 1995)  devel op t hi s analysi s by i dent i f yi ng t wo   sources of  out put
vari abil i t y wh i ch we   ma y   i dent i f y as econom i call y-sourced and pol i t i call y-sourced.
Rogoff  focused on t he fi r st but  Al esina and G at t i ,  by addi ng pol i t i cal uncert aint y
i nt o t he analysi s,  show  how  out put   vari abil i t y ma y   be r educed by t he del egati on of
m onet ary  pol i cy t o  an i ndependent   centr al  bank.
The  present  paper  s u mma r i ses t he  r esult s of  Al esina  and  Ga t t i   and  show s  how
t he Rogoff  result s are a special case of t hei r  analysi s. It  t hen t akes as given a
count r y’s  me mb e r ship of Econom i c and M onet ary U ni on (EM U) .  I t  t herefore
accepts the del egati on of m onet ary pol i cy to an i ndependent  centr al bank (t he
Eur opean Cent r al Bank or ECB)  as given.  I n addi t i on t o count r i es delegati ng
m onet ary pol i cy t o t he ECB,   t hey have also agreed upon The  St abil i t y and Gr ow t h
Pact  ( SGP) ,   wh i ch pl aces a l i mi t   on nat i onal   f i scal  defi cit s of  EM U  me mb e r s.  I t   i s
t hen argued usi ng t he analyt i cal fr am ew ork devel oped by A l esina and G at t i  that
out put   vari abil i t y  ma y   be  l ow er  wi t h  t he  SGP  t han  wi t hout   i t .
The   Re s ul t s of  R ogoff   and  Al esina  &  Ga t t i
Rogoff  (1985) dem onst r ated how  handi ng m onet ary pol i cy to an i ndependent
centr al bank coul d reduce infl ati on bi as but  at t he expense of i ncreased output
vol ati l i t y.   Ye t   by del egati ng t he cont r ol   of  m onet ary pol i cy t o an agent  w ho i s mo r e
i nfl ati on-  averse t han  t hem sel ves,   a pol i cy-ma k e r   i ncreases t hei r   ow n  we l f are.  Wh i l st
t hi s w oul d r esult   i n a l ow er  average i nfl ati on r ate and l ow er  i nfl ati on vari ance,  t he3
econom y’s out put  vari ance w ould be greater despi t e the average level of out put
r em aini ng  at  t he  nat ural  r ate.
Al esina and G at t i  argue t hat  not  onl y can shocks t o an econom y generate
out put   vari ance,  but   so can pol i t i cal  f actors.  I f   t here i s uncert aint y over  t he r esult   of
an electi on and i f  two  p a r t i es assign di f f erent val ues t o t he relati ve benefi t s fr om
stabil i sati on and i nfl ati on-r educt i on,  a furt her source of vari abil i t y i n out put  i s
i dent i f i ed.  Thi s addi t i onal   source of  vari abil i t y r esult s f r om  a part i cular  sequence of
events. Fi r st,  w age bargai ners set wa g e s  a t  the begi nni ng of a peri od before an
electi on i s then hel d and w hen t he out com e of the el ecti on i s sti l l  unknow n.  The
elected part y t hen set s infl ati on,  but  the uncert aint y over the el ecti on and w hi ch
part y w oul d be com i ng t o pow er m eans that  actual  and expect ed infl ati on di verge.
Thi s is because in set t i ng w ages,  econom i c agents had gi ven som e w ei ght  to t he
l i kel y  i nfl ati on  under  bot h  part i es i n  det ermi ni ng  wh a t   t hey  expected f ut ure i nfl ati on
t o be.  In t he si mp l est form o f  the m odel ,  w e assum e that  electi ons are held every
peri od  and  wa g e s   are set  before each electi on.
Bot h m odel s are  Ne w- Cl assical and are represented by a Lucas Surpri se
Suppl y  Funct i on.   A ddi t i onal l y,   how ever,   r andom   econom i c shocks  are all ow ed  t o  hi t
t he econom y and are represented by an independent l y and i dent i call y di str i but ed
shock  t erm,  et.   Thi s has  zero  m ean and  vari ance,  s e
2 .   Ther efore,  we   can m odel   t he
out put   of  t he  econom y  at  t i me   t   as:
Yttt
e
t =−+ ΠΠe ( 1)
wh e r e Πt  and Πt
e  are t he actual   and expected r ates of  i nfl ati on i n peri od t .  Fur t her,











wh e r ek  i s the t arget  level of out put  of all  pol i cy-ma k e r s, wh i ch is assum ed to be
greater  t han t he nat ural  l evel  of  out put ,   and Y  i s t he actual   l evel  of  out put .  bi  i s t he
benefi t  param eter for pol i cy-ma k e r  i and i s the relati ve w ei ght  att ached to out put
stabil i sati on  as opposed  t o  i nfl ati on.
Rogoff   r efers t o  onl y  one  pol i cy-ma k e r   t ype  but ,   f ol l ow i ng  Al esina  and  Ga t t i ,
we   can i dent i f y a l eft   of  centr e part y ( L)   and a r i ght   of  centr e part y ( R) .   We   assum e
L  pl aces greater  i m port ance on  stabil i sati on  over  i nfl ati on-r educt i on  t han  R.   The  t wo
part i es t hus  have  di f f erent  benefi t   param eters bL  and  bR,   wi t h  0  <  bR  <  bL.   That   i s t o
say, the l eft  of centr e part y perceives a greater benefi t  fr om  surpri se infl ati on t han
t he ri ght  of centr e part y,  as that  imp l i es greater eff ort s are goi ng i nt o st abil i sati on,
wh i ch i s t he  ( r elati vel y)  preferr ed pol i cy choi ce of  L.   I f   m onet ary  pol i cy i s del egated
t o an i ndependent   centr al  bank,   t hei r   benefi t   param eter  wi l l   be chosen as b
^
.  In t he
Rogoff  mo d e l ,  wi t h a si ngl e pol i cy-ma k e r  t ype w i t h benefi t  param eter b,  i t  i s
opt i mu m  f or  t he pol i cy-ma k e r   t o del egate such t hat  bb
^
< .  Wi t h A l esina and G at t i ,
we   assum e bb b RL
^
<< .   The  r esult s of  bot h  m odel s are s u mma r i sed i n  Tabl e 1:
Tabl e 1:  Econom i c Ou t com es and  Ce nt ral  Bankers
Dependent Independent
Πt
e Pb b b b
bP b b



















LL R L R
() ()










































[ () ( ) ]



















P i s the probabi l i t y of an electi on vi ctory by L (1-P bei ng t he probabi l i t y of R
wi nni ng).  The r esult s show n are fr om  t he A l esina and G at t i  m odel .  The var i ance
t erms  f or out put  and i nfl ati on under a dependent  centr al bank and pol i t i cised
m onet ary pol i cy-ma k i ng have t wo  e l em ents. The f i r st i s the pol i t i call y-sourced
vari ati on and t he second t he econom i call y-sourced vari ati on.   By  ma k i ng t he centr al
bank  i ndependent ,   t he  electoral  consi derati ons  are r em oved.   The  di f f erences bet w een
bL and bR are rem oved and t he benefi t  param eter becom es b
^
,  the param eter of the
i ndependent  centr al bank.  The eff ect of t hi s is to rem ove m ost  elem ents of t he
f ormu l ae in t he l eft  hand col um n and t he equat i ons col l apse to t hose i n t he ri ght
hand  colum n.
The equati ons show n for an independent  centr al bank are therefore equal to
t he Rogoff  result s, that  is to say Rogoff  is a special case of Al esina and G at t i .  An
‘ appropri ate’ choi ce of b
^
 can deli ver bot h l ow er expected infl ati on and a l ow er
vari ance of infl ati on.  Ho we v e r ,  the si gni f i cant result  hi ghl i ght ed by A l esina and
Ga t t i  is that  an independent  centr al bank does not  necessari l y i nfer greater out put
vari abil i t y t han w i t h a dependent  centr al bank,  as concluded by Rogoff  (1985).
Al esina and G at t i  argue t hat  wi t h a dependent  centr al bank “t he vari ance of out put
can easil y  be  l arger  t han  t he  vari ance of  out put   wi t h  an i ndependent   centr al  bank”  ( p.
199).  If  the t wo  p a r t i es w ere ident i cal,  the di f f erence betw een the dependent  and
i ndependent  centr al banker scenari os w oul d depend upon t he degree to w hi ch
bb b LR
∧
<=.   Wi t h i dent i cal  part i es,  t he pol i t i cs di sappears and we   are l eft   simp l y wi t h
t he  not i on  t hat   t he  i ndependent   centr al  banker  i s mo r e i nfl ati on-averse.  Ne v e r t hel ess,
as t he  di f f erence bet w een t he  benefi t   param eters of  t he  t wo   pol i cy-ma k e r s i ncreases,
t he i m port ance of t he pol i t i cal vari ance also increases w it h i ncreased poli t i cal
uncert aint y.   For   a suff i cientl y  l arge  di f f erence bet w een t he  benefi t   param eters bL  and
bR,  t he pol i t i cal t erm  dom i nat es. I n t hi s case, t he vari ance of out put  wi t h an
i ndependent   centr al  bank w oul d be ‘ signi f i cantl y l ow er’   t han t hat   prevail i ng wi t h a
dependent   centr al  bank,   w hose pol i cies w oul d be det ermi ned by wh i chever  part y,   L
or  R,   t hat   wa s   i n  pow er.6
EM U  and  t he  St abi l i t y  and  Gr o wt h  Pact
The wor k of Rogoff  and of Al esina and G at t i ,  out l i ned above,  r elates
specif i call y  t o  t he  case of  a singl e count r y  and  t he  i m pact  on  t he  out put   vari abil i t y  of
t hat  count r y havi ng a dependent  or independent  centr al bank.  The conclusi on of
Rogoff   i s t hat   such pol i cy del egati on wi l l   l ead t o greater  out put   vari abil i t y.   Al esina
and G at t i ,  how ever,  suggest  that  Rogoff ’ s analysi s w as part i al,  by exam ini ng onl y
econom i c factors that  coul d generate vari abil i t y i n out put .  By i ncl udi ng pol i t i cal
f actors as w ell ,  t he m ove t o an i ndependent  centr al bank m ay reduce out put
vari abil i t y.
The  sit uat i on under  EM U  i s,  how ever,   r ather  di f f erent.   I n part i cular,   t here i s
no choi ce about  wh e t her or not  to have an i ndependent  centr al bank.  Thi s imp l i es
simp l y t hat ,   ot her  t hi ngs bei ng equal ,   t he i ndependent   centr al  bank out com es show n
i n  Tabl e 1  are t hose  t hat   appl y  i n  EM U.   I nt ui t i vel y,   how ever,   t hi s i s not   t he  case,  f or
a num ber  of  r easons.  Fi r st,   t here i s t he di f f erence created by havi ng an i nt ernat i onal
sett i ng.   Ra t her  t han  havi ng  nat i onal   m onet ary  pol i cy decisions  and  nat i onal   electoral
consi derati ons,   t here i s now  an i nt ernat i onal   Eur o-wi de sett i ng f or  m onet ary pol i cy.
Wi t h an i ndependent   centr al  bank t here are,  as alr eady dem onst r ated i n t he nat i onal
sett i ng,   no  pol i t i cal  i nfl uences  on  t hat   m onet ary  pol i cy -   all   vari ati on  com es t hrough
econom i c f actors onl y.
Cont r asti ng  wi t h  Eur opean m onet ary  pol i cy,  how ever,   i s nat i onal   f i scal  pol i cy
and  t he  pot enti al  i nfl uences  dom est i c pol i t i cal  consi derati ons  ma y   have  f or  t hat .   The
existence of the St abil i t y and G row t h Pact (SGP)  indi cates concern over possibl e
negat i ve  spil l overs f or  t he  m onet ary  pol i cy decisions  of  t he  ECB  f r om   nat i onal   f i scal
pol i cies. Gi ven t he rem oval  of i nt r a-Eur o exchange rates and the del egati on of
m onet ary pol i cy to t he  ECB,  t he m ai n econom i c tool  r etained by nat i onal
governm ent s is fi scal pol i cy. To t he ext ent that  nat i onal  authori t i es can generate
i nfl ati on t hrough t hei r   f i scal  pol i cies,  vi a t he i m pact  on aggregate dem and,   a f urt her7
source of vari abil i t y i n out put  can be ident i f i ed. Thus,  despi t e the presence of an
i ndependent   centr al  bank  pol i t i call y  i nduced  vari ance sti l l   ma t t ers.  The  ECB  prot ects
m onet ary pol i cy fr om  dom est i c part y-pol i t i cal consi derati ons,  but  does not  do t he
sam e f or  f i scal  pol i cy.
The pr esence of the SG P can be seen as an att em pt to t r y t o ensure nati onal
f i scal pol i cies do not  com prom i se the m onet ary pol i cy stance of the  ECB.  To t he
extent  t hat   nat i onal   authori t i es pursue expansi onary and i nfl ati onary f i scal  pol i cies,
t he  ECB mus t  pursue a ti ght er m onet ary pol i cy in order to achieve a part i cular
i nfl ati on rate. Fol l ow i ng on fr om  t he previous sect i on,  i t  i s thus a quest i on of
wh e t her or not  the presence of the St abil i t y and G row t h Pact (SGP)  is capable of
r educi ng out put  vari abil i t y bel ow  t he l evel pert aini ng w i t hout  it s existence. Thi s
i mp l i es t hat   Al esina and Ga t t i   wi l l   becom e a specif i c case of  a mo r e general  m odel
sti l l ,  wh i ch takes an independent  centr al bank as gi ven,  but  i ncorporates fi scal
pol i cy.  I n  t hi s m odel ,   i n  addi t i on  t o  t he  econom i call y-sourced out put   vari abil i t y  f r om
t he  exogenous  shock,   t here coul d  be  a shock  t o  out put   f r om   pol i t i cal  sources,  as wi t h
Al esina and G at t i ,  but  in t hi s case deri vi ng fr om  di f f erent stances tow ards fi scal
pol i cy by  di f f erent  part i es i n  each count r y.
I n order  t o simp l i f y t he analysi s,  we   can use exactl y t he sam e algebraic m odel
as Al esina and Ga t t i   i f   we   can understand how  a count r y can have di f f erent  benefi t
param eters f or  di f f erent  pol i t i cal  part i es wh i ch converge  i n  t he  presence of  t he  SGP.
We   can i dent i f y  bL  and  bR  as before and  we   assum e t hat ,   vi a t he  i m pact  of  dom est i c
f i scal  pol i cy on aggregate dem and,   t he preferr ed i nfl ati on r ate f or  L  i s greater  t han
t he desi r ed infl ati on rate for R whi ch is, in t urn,  greater than t he desi r ed infl ati on
r ate of the  ECB.  In ot her wo r ds,  ΠΠΠ LRE C B
des >> .  In t erms  o f  short  run pol i t i cal
gai n,   we   ma y   assum e t hat   a nat i onal   pol i t i cal  part y  wi l l   i ncrease expendi t ures above
t axes and  t hus  generate an i ncrease i n  t he  defi cit .
The  presence of  t he SGP,   how ever,   i s desi gned t o t r y t o ensure such nat i onal
f i scal pol i cy autonom y does not  result  in a hi gher defi cit .  Thi s imp l i es, therefore,
t hat  the 3%  l i mi t  on permi t t ed nati onal  defi cit s w il l  restr ain nat i onal  governm ent s’8
abil i t y t o expand t he econom y usi ng fi scal m eans for pol i t i cal gai n - we r e the 3%
l i mi t   under  t he SGP  not   bi ndi ng,   t here w oul d be no poi nt   i n i t s existence.  I t   i s t hus
t he case that  the SGP at t em pts to reduce the abi l i t y of governm ent s of L and R t o
generate i nfl ati on dow n t ow ards t he l evel  desi r ed by t he ECB  ( even i f   t he r etenti on
of a degree of nat i onal  fi scal autonom y m eans i t  wi l l  rem ain narr ow l y above t hi s
l evel) .   As   t he  SGP  ma k e s   no  all ow ance f or  pol i t i cal  vari ati on,   i t   i s also assum ed t hat
ΠL wi l l  need to fall  furt her than ΠR  and t hus t he t wo  v a l ues converge on a l evel
mu c h   closer  t o ΠECB
des   t han  w oul d  be  t he  case i n  t he  absence of  t he  SGP.
The  presence of  t he SGP,   i n t urn,   also m eans t hat   i n calculati ng bL  and bR,   t he
r especti ve part i es assign a hi gher  cost  t o i nfl ati on t han before,  gi ven t he presence of
t he fi nanci al penal t y for exceeding t he 3%  defi cit  level.  As  t he possi bl e values of
ΠL  and ΠR   f all   and  converge  wi t h  t he  SGP,   so i n  t urn  do  t he  r especti ve  val ues  of  bL
and  bR.
Co nc l usi ons
The  centr al  concl usi on  f r om   t he  f oregoi ng  di scussion  i s essenti all y  t he  sam e as
t hat   r eached by Al esina and Ga t t i .   Ou t put   vari abil i t y can com e f r om  econom i c and
pol i t i cal sources. In EM U ,  the econom i c vari abil i t y can com e fr om  a shock t o an
econom y,   i n mu c h   t he sam e wa y   as i t   can occur  i n t he analysi s of  bot h Al esina and
Ga t t i  and Rogoff .  The pol i t i call y-i nduced out put  vari abil i t y,  how ever,  com es not
f r om  a dependent  centr al bank and pol i t i cised m onet ary pol i cy, but  f r om  t he
cont i nued possibi l i t y t hat   nat i onal   pol i t i cal  and electoral  condi t i ons and uncert aint y
coul d  l ead t o  pol i t i cal  part i es i n  i ndi vi dual   count r i es usi ng  f i scal  pol i cy f or  t hei r   ow n
advant age, in t urn generati ng i nfl ati on t hat  coul d com prom i se the m onet ary pol i cy
stance of  t he  ECB.
By  pl acing  an eff ecti ve  l i mi t   on  t he  budget   defi cit s a count r y  can r un,   t he  SGP
i s i m posi ng a l i mi t   on t he extent  t o wh i ch a count r y can undert ake expansi onary or9
l ax f i scal  pol i cy i n order  t o achieve short   t erm  pol i t i cal  gai ns.   I t   t hus,   i n t urn,   r aises
t he  costs associated wi t h  i nfl ati on  f or  i ndi vi dual   pol i t i cal  part i es i n  me mb e r   states.  I t
i s t hi s wh i ch can be  seen as l eading  t o  a convergence  i n  t he  val ues  of  bL  and  bR.
The  eff ect  of  t he  SGP  on  out put   vari abil i t y  can be  seen as bei ng  r epresented by
t he  algebra of  Al esina  and  Ga t t i ,   as s u mma r i sed i n  Tabl e 1.   Wi t h  a suff i cientl y  l arge
di f f erence bet w een bL  and  bR,   t he  pol i t i call y-i nduced  vari abil i t y  out put   can dom i nat e
t he econom i call y-i nduced vari ati on.  To t he ext ent t hat  t he SGP l eads to a
convergence  i n  bL  and  bR,   i t   i s possibl e t hat   t he existence of  t he SGP  can r esult   i n a
r educt i on  i n  out put   vari abil i t y  com pared t o  an EM U  wi t hout   an SGP.
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